NANDI Proxmox MCP

Turn your Proxmox cluster into an AI-driven platform with 140+ tools for automation, monitoring, and controlled execution.

Open source MCP server for Proxmox VE, powered by NANDI Services.

nandi-proxmox-mcp exposes Proxmox inventory, lifecycle, storage, backup, networking, firewall, access, monitoring, SSH diagnostics, and guarded remote/container operations without removing the safety rails needed for production clusters.

What stays enabled

140+ tools across nodes, cluster, QEMU, LXC, storage, backup, tasks, network, firewall, pools, access, templates, monitoring, and remote operations.
Access tiers: read-only, read-execute, full.
Module split: PVE_MODULE_MODE=core|advanced.
Tool filters: PVE_CATEGORIES, PVE_TOOL_BLACKLIST, PVE_TOOL_WHITELIST.
Destructive guardrails via confirm=true.
Backward-compatible aliases such as listNodes, getVMStatus, startVM, stopContainer.
stdio transport for MCP clients and Streamable HTTP transport for controlled remote deployments.

Required permissions

The server needs two trust channels and both are preserved intentionally:

Proxmox API token
- Used for inventory, lifecycle, configuration, and management endpoints.
- Keep ACLs minimal: only grant the roles needed for the tools you actually enable.
SSH batch access to the Proxmox host
- Required for pct exec, batch SSH diagnostics, and container-level Docker inspection tools.
- This is still necessary because Proxmox API coverage does not replace host-side pct and SSH-based diagnostics.

More detail: docs/PERMISSIONS.md

Destructive confirmations

Operations marked destructive do not execute unless the caller sends confirm=true.

Examples:

VM/container stop, shutdown, reboot, suspend, delete, migrate, snapshot rollback
storage/network/firewall/access writes that can alter cluster state
advanced remote execution such as pve_exec_in_container

The server returns a structured CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED error when confirmation is missing. This behavior is unchanged and reinforced.

Human approval

confirm=true is supplied by the agent, not by you. A model that reads the rejection can simply retry with the flag set, so on its own that check guards against an accident rather than against a confident agent — and it never asks you anything.

So the 47 tools that require confirmation are also announced to the client as needing a person:

"_meta": { "anthropic/requiresUserInteraction": true }

In Claude Code 2.1.199 and later, a tool marked this way prompts on every call — including in auto and bypassPermissions modes — and cannot be pre-approved by an allow rule or by a PreToolUse hook returning allow. Under --permission-prompt-tool an automated approval is converted to a denial, and Remote Control withholds one-tap approval and sends you to the full prompt. The operator who answered is the one who authorised the operation.

One caveat, measured on 2.1.229 rather than taken from the documentation: the prompt still offers "Yes, and don't ask again", even though the documentation says a flagged tool has no such option. Choosing it writes an allow rule that does not retire the gate — the next call prompts again. So the behaviour is right and only the button is misleading. Do not read its absence as the signal that the guard is on; verify by calling a gated tool twice.

Starting and resuming a guest are deliberately left out: they change state without destroying anything, and a guard people resent is a guard people route around.

setup additionally writes matching permissions.ask rules into .claude/settings.json, which cover Claude Code versions that predate the annotation. Rules are evaluated deny, then ask, then allow — first match wins — so an ask rule survives both bypassPermissions and a later "yes, don't ask again". For an install that was configured by hand rather than through setup:

nandi-proxmox-mcp harden              # every configured instance
nandi-proxmox-mcp harden --name lab   # just one

Both mechanisms are Claude Code specific. In any other client the guards are confirm=true and the access tier, so choose the tier deliberately there.

Access tiers

read-only
- Inventory, status, logs, metrics, and non-mutating diagnostics.
read-execute
- Read-only plus selected execution/lifecycle actions.
full
- Create, update, delete, migrate, restore, and admin-level operations.

PVE_MODULE_MODE=core hides advanced tools without renaming or removing canonical tool IDs from the codebase.

Runtime configuration

Environment variables

Required:

PROXMOX_HOST
PROXMOX_USER
PROXMOX_REALM
PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME
PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET
PROXMOX_SSH_HOST
PROXMOX_SSH_USER
PROXMOX_SSH_KEY_PATH

Optional:

PROXMOX_PORT default 8006
PROXMOX_SSH_PORT default 22
PROXMOX_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS default false
PVE_ACCESS_TIER=read-only|read-execute|full
PVE_MODULE_MODE=core|advanced
PVE_CATEGORIES
PVE_TOOL_BLACKLIST
PVE_TOOL_WHITELIST

HTTP transport:

MCP_TRANSPORT=stdio|http
MCP_HOST default 0.0.0.0
MCP_PORT default 3000
MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS
MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
MCP_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS
MCP_RATE_LIMIT_MAX
MCP_MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES
MCP_HEADERS_TIMEOUT_MS
MCP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS
MCP_KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT_MS
MCP_MAX_HEADERS_COUNT

Local config file

Setup writes one credentials file per configured Proxmox, .nandi-proxmox-mcp/<instance>.json, plus a registration entry in each client config it was asked for — .mcp.json for Claude Code and .vscode/mcp.json for VS Code, by default both.

The credentials file is the only one holding the token, and it is gitignored. When NANDI_PROXMOX_CONFIG is not set, the server discovers it: a single configured instance is used automatically, and more than one is an error naming them rather than a guess.

The config loader now rejects:

empty or malformed config paths
oversized config files
control characters in config paths

Quick start

Never used an MCP before? Start with docs/EMPEZAR.md — a step-by-step guide (in Spanish) that assumes no prior MCP knowledge and covers creating the Proxmox token, which is the part that trips most people up.

You need an API token from your own Proxmox first. This prints the commands that create one, ready to paste into the Proxmox shell — it connects to nothing:

npx nandi-proxmox-mcp bootstrap --tier read-only

Then guided setup. By default this writes config for Claude Code (.mcp.json) and VS Code (.vscode/mcp.json), merging into either file if it already exists:

npx nandi-proxmox-mcp setup --access-tier read-only
npx nandi-proxmox-mcp doctor --check mcp-config,nodes,vms,cts,node-status,remote-op

Start with --access-tier read-only. The server's built-in default is full, which exposes every destructive tool including arbitrary command execution; passing the flag writes the tier explicitly into the client config so the choice is visible rather than implicit. Raise it once you trust the setup.

Pick specific clients, or print a block for any other MCP client:

npx nandi-proxmox-mcp setup --clients claude-code
npx nandi-proxmox-mcp setup --print-config          # writes nothing, safe to pipe

.mcp.json holds only a config path and policy settings, so it is safe to commit and share. Your API token stays in .nandi-proxmox-mcp/config.json, which is gitignored.

Direct run with environment variables:

$env:PROXMOX_HOST="pve.local"
$env:PROXMOX_PORT="8006"
$env:PROXMOX_USER="svc_mcp"
$env:PROXMOX_REALM="pve"
$env:PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME="nandi-mcp"
$env:PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET="<SECRET>"
$env:PROXMOX_SSH_HOST="pve.local"
$env:PROXMOX_SSH_USER="root"
$env:PROXMOX_SSH_KEY_PATH="$env:USERPROFILE\.ssh\id_ed25519"

npx nandi-proxmox-mcp run

Security Model & Residual Risk

This MCP server operates real Proxmox infrastructure and is not a sandboxed environment.

Trust Assumptions

The server is deployed in a trusted environment
Only authorized operators can access it
Network exposure is controlled (not publicly exposed)
Credentials are securely managed

Residual Risks

The following risks are inherent to the system design:

Privileged Operations
Full access tier and container execution capabilities can perform destructive or system-level actions.
SSH Execution Boundary
Remote command execution relies on SSH and inherits the security posture of the target system.
Optional Insecure TLS Mode
When enabled (PROXMOX_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS=true), TLS certificate validation is bypassed and may expose connections to MITM attacks. Intended for lab use only.
External Dependency Synchronization
Package distribution and listing visibility depend on npm, MCP Registry, and marketplace propagation timing.

Security Responsibilities

Users are responsible for:

Restricting access to trusted operators only
Using least-privilege API tokens and SSH keys
Avoiding insecure TLS in production environments
Properly securing the underlying infrastructure

Safety Controls Implemented

Access tiers (read-only, read-execute, full)
Confirmation required for destructive operations
Human approval required for those same operations, see Human approval
Input validation and command hardening
Rate limiting and request validation

HTTP hardening

The HTTP transport performs no authentication. There is no bearer token, API key, or client-certificate check on POST /mcp; the controls below are network-level only. MCP_HOST also defaults to 0.0.0.0, and the host allowlist includes your configured Proxmox and SSH hosts. Anyone who can reach the port and send a matching Host header gets the full registered tool surface — which, with the default PVE_ACCESS_TIER=full, includes destructive tools and arbitrary command execution.

Only enable MCP_TRANSPORT=http on a trusted network, behind an authenticating reverse proxy, or bound to 127.0.0.1 via MCP_HOST. The default stdio transport is not affected: it has no network surface.

When MCP_TRANSPORT=http is enabled, the server applies:

host allowlist enforcement, including wildcard-bind protection
origin validation for requests that send an Origin header
explicit body-size limits and sanitized 413 responses
rate limiting on /mcp
request/header/keep-alive timeouts
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Cache-Control: no-store
sanitized error payloads without stack traces

Health/readiness endpoints:

GET /health
GET /ready
POST /mcp

SSH and command-execution hardening

Functionality is unchanged, but the execution path is stricter:

local command execution still uses spawn(..., { shell: false })
SSH host/user values cannot smuggle CLI options
SSH uses BatchMode, IdentitiesOnly, public-key auth, and explicit connection liveness controls
output buffers are capped to prevent unbounded memory growth
dockerLogsInContainer now validates and shell-escapes container names instead of interpolating raw user input
arbitrary container command execution remains available only through the already-destructive pve_exec_in_container flow with confirmation required

Security posture

Mitigations in the repo:

pinned direct dependency versions and npm overrides for critical transitive packages
verifiable package metadata and repository links for npm/package scanners
descriptor/version sync validation for npm, registry, and marketplace artifacts
redaction of token/header/password-like values in logs
no stack traces or secrets returned to clients
CI gates for lint, typecheck, build, tests, metadata validation, descriptor sync, npm pack --dry-run, and audit

Threat model and residual risks: docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

Publish flow

Releases are automatic. A push to main runs auto-release.yml, which reads the bump level from the conventional-commit subjects since the last v* tag, writes the new version into every file that carries one, commits chore(release): vX.Y.Z, and pushes the tag. The tag is what starts release.yml and the publish below.

Commit	Bump
`feat:`	minor
`fix:`, `perf:`, `revert:`	patch
`feat!:` or a `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer	major — strict semver, so `0.x` goes to `1.0.0`
`chore:`, `docs:`, `test:`, `ci:`, `build:`, `style:`, `refactor:`	nothing is published

A push with nothing releasable finishes green and lists the commits it skipped. Run the workflow by hand with dry_run: true to see the version and the diff without publishing.

The version lives in eight places — manifests, both registry descriptors, the marketplace plugin, two docs examples and two TypeScript literals. scripts/set-version.mjs writes all of them and scripts/validate-package-metadata.mjs gates all of them. Adding a ninth means editing both: a writer that touches a file the validator ignores is how 0.3.1 shipped announcing itself as 0.2.4.

Release order, once the tag exists, is strict:

npm run lint
npm run typecheck
npm run build
npm test
npm audit --include=dev --audit-level=moderate
npm ls express
npm ls path-to-regexp
npm pack --dry-run
npm pack
npm whoami
npm publish --access public
npm view nandi-proxmox-mcp version
mcp-publisher validate .mcp/server.json
mcp-publisher publish .mcp/server.json

The tag-based release.yml now publishes npm first and only then publishes the MCP Registry descriptor, preventing npm/registry drift on the same version.

If a release dies halfway, re-run it — gh workflow run release.yml --ref vX.Y.Z — rather than finishing it by hand. Every publishing step asks its destination first and skips what is already there, so the re-run completes only the parts that did not happen. The job refuses any ref that is not a tag, and any tag that disagrees with the version in package.json.

Manual fallback and troubleshooting: docs/RELEASE.md

Development

npm ci
npm run lint
npm run typecheck
npm run build
npm test
npm run validate:release
npm pack --dry-run

Documentation Maintenance Policy

This repository follows a documentation sync policy, enforced in review rather than by a git hook.

There is no pre-commit hook. The one gate that is automated is in CI (.github/workflows/ci.yml): it regenerates docs/TOOLS.md and fails the build on any drift. Note also that a repo-local .git/hooks/pre-commit would not run on a machine where core.hooksPath is redirected, which is common.

Before closing a change, fix, or refactor, evaluate whether README.md, AGENTS.md, and CONTRIBUTING.md must be updated.
If a document is relevant to the behavioral or process impact, it must be updated in the same change set.
If no update is needed, an explicit no-doc-change justification is required.
A task is not considered ready-to-commit until this gate is satisfied.

Docs

docs/EMPEZAR.md — start here if MCP servers are new to you
docs/CLAUDE_CODE_SETUP.md
docs/QUICKSTART.md
docs/PERMISSIONS.md
docs/SECURITY.md
docs/THREAT_MODEL.md
docs/RELEASE.md
docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md
docs/TOOLS.md
docs/MARKETPLACE_GO_LIVE.md

Registry and marketplace

npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/nandi-proxmox-mcp
MCP Registry: https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/
MCP Marketplace listing: https://mcp-marketplace.io/server/io-github-nandi-services-nandi-proxmox-mcp

License

MIT. See LICENSE.

proxmox-mcp

Install to Claude Code

README